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the	human	heart	 in	complying	with	 the	adopted	maxims,	or	 the	 frailty [Ge-
brechlichkeit]	of	human	nature”.	In	the	Metaphysics of Morals,	he	is	more	likely	
to	use	 the	 term	 ‘weakness’	 (cf.	MS	 6:408),	 but	he	does	 sometimes	opt	 for	
‘frailty’	as	well	(cf.	MS	6:446).	I	will	use	 ‘frailty’	and	 ‘weakness’	 interchange-
ably,	 typically	prioritizing	 ‘weakness’	 to	maintain	a	 connection	 to	 the	 stan-
dard	 English	 terminology.	 Although,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Kant	 means	
something	broader	in	scope	than	what	is	traditionally	understood	by	‘weak-























The	aim	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	offer	a	 radically	different	understand-
ing	of	Kant’s	moral	psychology	and	 its	 relation	 to	 the	early	modern	
tradition	by	 focusing	on	 the	particular	 topic	 of	moral	weakness.	 Ex-
ploring	some	of	 the	basic	 tenets	of	Kant’s	position,	 I	will	argue	 that	




5.	 See,	for	example,	Guyer,	Knowledge, Reason, and Taste, p.	165:	“[Kant]	also	as-
sumes	 that	 some	 sort	 of	what	Hume	would	 call	 an	 ‘affection’	must	be	 the	
proximate	phenomenal	or	empirical	cause	of	any	action”.	
6.	 Again,	Guyer,	Knowledge, Reason, and Taste, p.	182:	“Kant	holds	that	we	must	
suppose	we	have	freedom	of	the	will	at	the	noumenal	level,	where	the	causal	
determinism	 that	holds	 throughout	 the	phenomenal	world	and	 that	might	
there	seem	sometimes	to	stand	in	the	way	of	our	being	free	to	do	as	morality	
requires	does	not	obtain”.
7.	 Kant citations are given in standard notation: Critique of  Pure Reason is cited using A and B 
edition page numbers, and all other works are cited using the volume and page numbers 
from the Academy Editions. Works are abbreviated as follows:
A: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of  View
G: Groundwork of  the Metaphysics of  Morals
KpV: Critique of  Practical Reason
KU: Critique of  the Power of  Judgment
LE: Lectures on Ethics
MS: The Metaphysics of  Morals
P: Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics
R: Religion within the boundaries of  mere reason













the	 realm	of	 sense	and	 the	 realm	of	 reason,	 to	 illustrate.	 If	his	 inter-
preter	adopts	an	understanding	of	 this	distinction	on	which	human	






to	 address	 two	 very	 different	 kinds	 of	 philosophical	 pressure,	 each	
on	 its	 own	 terms.	 The	 nature	 of	 human	 action,	 understood	 as	 phe-





es	of	 the	main	article	on	Kant	 in	 the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy:	
“Immanuel	Kant	(1724−1804)	is	the	central	figure	in	modern	philosophy.	He 
synthesized early modern rationalism and empiricism,	set	the	terms	for	much	of	
nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 century	philosophy,	 and	 continues	 to	 exercise	 a	
significant	influence	today	…”	(Rohlf,	“Immanuel	Kant”,	n.p.,	emphasis	mine).
4.	 For	interpretations	of	this	stripe,	see	McCarty,	Kant’s Theory of Action, pp.	xxi−ii,	
and	Guyer,	Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s Response to Hume, p.	165.
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other	than	practical	reason”	(G	4:412).	On	the	reading	I	will	suggest,	
this	 implies	 that	sensible	desire	can	have	only	a	 limited	kind	of	effi-
cacy	in	our	practical	lives	because	it	is	ultimately	practical	reason	that	








It	 is,	however,	equally	 true	 that	 the	 reading	 to	 follow	will	not	 re-
treat	into	an	overly	rationalistic	conception	of	Kant’s	position,	explain-
ing	away	the	possibility	that	sensible	desire	could	disrupt	our	practi-
cal	 lives	 in	 any	meaningful	way.	 In	 this	 respect,	my	view	will	 differ	
from	 those	 that	 emphasize	—	or,	 as	 it	may	 be,	 overemphasize	—	the	
so-called	“Incorporation	Thesis”,	and	I	will	direct	our	attention	away	


















role	 these	desires	have	 in	 influencing	human	action	with	a	dualistic	moral	
psychology	that	takes	Kant’s	conception	of	sensibility	and	sensible	desire	to	
answer	to	empiricist	concerns.	
we	must	 rethink	 the	 role	 that	 empirically	discoverable,	 sense-based	
desire	plays	in	human	life.	The	picture	described	above	demonstrates	
an	 untenable	 dualism that	 understands	 reason	 and	 sensibility	 to	 be	
radically	distinct	capacities	best	understood	without	reference	to	one	
another.	As	I	would	have	it,	this	dualism	is	nowhere	present	in	Kant’s	


















tion	of	the	will	with	practical	reason	in	the	Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals.	For	Kant,	 the	essential	 form	of	our	volition	 is	captured	
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to	 explain	 the	possibility	of	weakness,	 I	will	 instead	 look	 to	 the	dif-


















Unpacking	 the	 latter	 involves	 discussing	 the	 agent’s	 intelligible	 or	



























role	 that	 reason	 plays	 in	 determining	 human	 action,	 and	 appeal	 to	
strong	sensible	desires	and	their	ability	to	disrupt	our	practical	lives.










of	 reason	and	 particular	 sensible	desires (§2.1).	This,	 I	will	 argue,	 is	
the	activity	of	practical	 judgment	 “by	which	what	 is	said	 in	 the	rule	
universally	(in abstracto)	is	applied	to	an	action	in concreto”	(KpV	5:67).12 
Locating	 the	 source	 of	 weakness	 in	 practical	 judgment	 accordingly	
shifts	the	locus	of	explanation.	While	McCarty	invokes	strong	sensible	
desires	 and	 Allison	 turns	 to	 self-deception	 regarding	 one’s	maxims	
12.	 Cf.	KU	5:179,	A	7:199	for	further	descriptions	of	the	power	of	judgment,	and	
MS	6:411	for	another	description	of	practical	judgment	in	particular.
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happiness	—	we	cannot	avoid	these	difficulties.	Kant’s	highly	complex	
account	 of	 sense-dependent	 practical	 reasoning	 thus	 reveals	 weak-
ness	to	be	an	inescapable	part	of	human	nature	against	which	we	must	
perennially	struggle.
1. Empiricist vs. Rationalist Interpretations of Kantian Weakness
1.1 Textual Foundations 
Kant’s	 reader	 can	find	discussions	of	human	weakness	 in	a	number	
of	his	published	works,	including Religion within the Boundaries of mere 
Reason,	 the	 Metaphysics of Morals,	 and	 Anthropology from a Pragmat-
ic Point of View,	as	well	as	in	student	notes	on	his	Lectures on Ethics.15 
Most	of	these	remarks	are,	however,	engaged	with	particular	empiri-
cal	examples,	and	so	are	 insufficient	 to	determine	 the	details	of	 the	



























The	 most	 important	 resource	 invoked	 for	 this	 purpose	 will	 be	
Kant’s	remarks	on	practical	 judgment	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue	from	
the	Metaphysics of Morals. I	will	 introduce	two	key	obstacles	 to	good	
practical	 judgment	 discussed	 there	 in	 connection	with	moral	 weak-
ness:	i)	the	Problem	of	Indeterminacy (§2.2.1),	and	ii)	the	Problem	of	
Affect (§2.2.2).	Each	of	 these	obstacles	 invokes	both	 reason	and	sen-
sibility,	describing	 some	difficulty	 that	 arises	 for	 judgment	 in	virtue	
of	their	interaction.	While	Indeterminacy	highlights	the	difficulties	in-
herent	to	applying	universal	practical	principles	to	particular	sensibly-
given	 contexts,	Affect	 highlights	 the	 difficulties	 inherent	 to	 rational	












onstrated	simply	 insofar	as	 the	agent	with	good	maxims	 in abstracto 
struggles	 to	apply	 these	principles	 in concreto	because	of	 the	difficul-
ties	of	indeterminacy	and	affect.	A	deep	truth	about	the	nature	of	our	
agency	lurks	here:	because	our	sense-dependence	entails	that	we	can-












pensity	 to	evil	 is	a	deed	 in	 this	noumenal	sense.	Kant	describes	 the	
propensity	to	evil	in	a	number	of	ways:




iii)	 as	 “the	 use	 of	 freedom	 through	which	 the	 supreme	
maxim	…	is	adopted	in	the	power	of	choice	[Willkür],	as	
to	 the	 use	 by	which	 the	 actions	 themselves	 (materially	




























an	 irresistible	 incentive	 objectively	 or	 ideally	 (in thesi),	




shows	 itself	at	 the	surface	 level:	 the	agent	who	 is	 interested	 in	mor-
al	 goodness	 acts	 on	 inclination	—	habitual	 sensible	 desire	—	instead.	














phenomena	 distinction	 as	 applied	 to	moral	 agents.	 To	 explain	 how	
moral	 character	 can	 be	 responsible	 for	 weak,	 impure,	 or	 depraved	
actions,	 Kant	 identifies	 two	 different	 meanings	 of	 the	 term	 ‘deed’.	
While	 the	phenomenal	deed	 refers	 to	 the	particular	 actions	we	 can	





















pure	 in	 heart	 but	 frail	…	 are	 those	who	 intellectually	 acknowledge	
the	supreme	authority	of	the	moral	law	but	may	nevertheless	choose,	
19.	 Though	 there	 are	 numerous	 references	 to	 human	 weakness	 in	 the	 subse-
quent	parts	of	the	Religion,	they	are	not	particularly	helpful	for	my	purposes	
here.	Most	of	these	passages	simply	reference	the	fact	of	human	weakness,	
taking	 it	 for	granted	 in	order	 to	discuss	how	 it	manifests	 itself	 in	 religious	
practice	(cf.	R	6:103,	141,	169,	191).	Some	passages	arguably	stretch	the	term	
to	a	more	general	use	that	goes	beyond	the	particular	feature	of	moral	psy-
chology	under	 examination	here,	 e.g.,	when	Kant	 speaks	of	 that	 aspect	 of	
prayer	which	“weakens	the	effect	of	the	moral	idea”	(R	6:197;	cf.	also	R	6:43,	





this	paper,	which	are	my	 concern	here.	 I	 am	grateful	 to	 an	anonymous	 re-
viewer	for	pointing	out	that	these	passages	should	be	addressed	for	the	sake	
of	accuracy	and	completeness.
on	 sensible	 inclinations,	 and	we	cannot	escape	 this	basic	 feature	of	
our	agency.	





in	 this	section,	 from	the	very	start,	we	sought	 the	 three	
sources	of	moral	evil	 solely	 in	 that	which	affects	 the	ul-
















18.	 In	his	 recent	commentary	on	 the	Religion, Lawrence	Pasternack	shows	that	
one	way	 to	deal	with	 this	question	 is	 to	deny	 that	 the	merely	weak	agent	












it	 is	entirely	appropriate	 to	 impute	 to	moral	agents	any	
transgression	due	to	moral	weakness,	even	though	there	
remains	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 we	 may	 say	 their	 transgres-















25.	 Allison,	Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p.	5.	The	central	passage	he	draws	upon	is	R	
6:24:	
  
	 freedom	of	 the	power	of	 choice	 [Willkür]	has	 the	characteristic,	 entirely	
peculiar	 to	 it,	 that	 it	 cannot	be	determined	 to	action	 through	any	 incen-
tive	 except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has	





















As	McCarty	 clarifies	elsewhere,	 this	view	of	moral	psychology	 is	
firmly	 grounded	 in	 a	 “two-worlds”	 interpretation	 of	 the	 noumena/
phenomena	distinction	that	invokes	the	actual	existence	of	two	sepa-













Kant:	 i)	 it	 accounts	 for	 the	 imputability	or	moral	 significance	of	 the	
20.	McCarty,	“Kantian	Moral	Motivation	and	the	Feeling	of	Respect”,	p.	431.	See	
also,	McCarty,	Kant’s Theory of Action;	McCarty,	“Moral	Weakness	as	Self-De-
ception”;	and	McCarty,	“Motivation	and	Moral	Choice”.
21.	 McCarty,	“Motivation	and	Moral	Choice”,	p.	26.
22.	McCarty,	Kant’s Theory of Action, chap.	4,	p.	105.
23.	McCarty,	“Motivation	and	Moral	Choice”,	p.	28.
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noumenal	deed.	Though	Allison’s	commitment	 to	 the	 Incorporation	
Thesis	leads	him	to	conclude	that	the	weak	agent	does	act	on	immoral	




good	—	insofar	 as	 it	 is	 genuinely	 committed	 to	 the	 struggle	 towards	






out	 the	 traditional	model	 on	which	 the	 agent	 is	 fully	 committed	 to	
and	aware	of	the	moral	constraints	in	play	but	lacks	the	motivational	
strength	 to	carry	out	 the	 required	action.	Because,	according	 to	Alli-
son’s	view,	sensible	incentives	must	ultimately	be	rationally	endorsed	
by	the	agent	if	they	are	to	be	acted	upon,	there	must	be	some	sense	in	
which	 the	weak	agent’s	maxims	do	not	demonstrate	a	 total	 commit-
ment	to	morality.	The	weak	agent’s	claim	to	have	adopted	the	moral	
law	as	their	supreme	maxim	is,	therefore,	the	result	of	self-deception:
the	 so-called	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 strength	 to	 follow	moral	
principles	when	 they	conflict	with	 the	claims	of	 inclina-
tion	reflects	the	lack	of	a	full	commitment	to	these	prin-
















weakly.	So	as	 I	will	argue,	 to	explain	weakness,	we	should	not	 look	 to	 the	
agent’s	maxim,	but	elsewhere.	
26.	Allison,	Kant’s Theory of Freedom,	p.	159.
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itself	is	construed	as	one	made	by	reason	functioning	in	isolation	from	




















so	 completely	 separated,	 the	 occurrence	 of	 weakness	 is	 effectively	
chalked	up	to	dispositional	luck:	“no	matter	how	strong	the	moral	in-
centive	 is	 in	us,	dispositionally,	 circumstances	 can	arise	where	 com-
peting	incentives	of	inclination	just	turn	out	to	be	stronger	than	our	








of	 the	personality	of	 the	moral	agent	 that	must	be	assigned	to	 their	
intelligible	 character,	 and	 invoked	 to	 accurately	 account	 for	 any	hu-
man	action.30 





noumenal	 and	phenomenal	deeds:	 a	dualistic	understanding	of	 rea-
son	as	the	source	of	the	former	lays	root	to	complications	in	explain-
ing	how	 this	noumenal	deed	grounds	 the	phenomenal	 actions	of	 a	
sensibly-affected	empirical	agent.	Bracketing	the	relevant	differences	
between	these	two	views,	we	find	that	both	McCarty	and	Allison	view	
the	 noumenal	 deed	 constitutive	 of	 weak	 action	 as	 some	 voluntary	
choice	or	commitment	to	prioritize	the	inclinations.	They	both	agree	










29.	 Ibid., p.	160.	The	passage	Allison	is	drawing	on	says	that	“Dieses [böse Herz] 






30.	Allison,	Kant’s Theory of Freedom, pp.	160−1.







tion	Thesis	 so	much	 that	 there	 appears	no	viable	 alternative	but	 to	
deny	the	traditional	conception	of	weakness	and	conclude	that	all	ac-
tion	reflects	our	considered	principles.	Sensibility	can,	in	effect,	only	
influence	 reason	 by	 transforming	 into	 something	 rational	—	namely,	










his	reflections	on	affect	from	the	Metaphysics of Morals and	Anthropol-
ogy from a Pragmatic Point of View:	“affect	is	surprise	through	sensation,	
by	means	of	which	the	mind’s	composure	is	suspended.	Affect	is	there-














This	 makes	 for	 a	 shockingly	 precarious	 view	 of	 virtue,	 even	 by	





the	question	of	whether	one	wants	 to	make	room	for	 the	 latter	phe-





aptitude	 and	 …	 a	 long-standing	 habit	 of	 morally	 good	
actions	 acquired	 by	 practice.	 For	 unless	 this	 aptitude	







for.	Kant	 explicitly	denies	 that	 virtue	 could	 result	 from	 the	habitual	






tant	 point	 of	 difference	 between	 Kant	 and	 Aristotle’s	 respective	 accounts,	
marking	the	philosophical	impasse	for	those	who	would	like	to	narrow	the	
divide	between	their	views	and	place	less	emphasis	on	the	deontology/virtue	
ethics	distinction.	For	an	extensive	account	of	 this	 comparison,	 see	Baxley,	
Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy. 
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2. Rethinking Weakness: Invoking Practical Judgment
2.1 Initial Support for a Judgment-Based Account of Weakness
I	 have	 now	 diagnosed	 the	 interpretive	 shortcomings	 of	 prominent	
interpretations	 of	 Kant’s	 account	 of	 weakness.	 These	 have	 all	 been	
characterized	as	stemming	from	the	assumption	of	dualism,	 i.e.,	 the	
assumption	that	reason	and	sensibility	are	understood	as	isolated	ca-
pacities	best	 explained	without	 reference	 to	one	another.	As	 I	have	
claimed,	this	will	result	in	either	something	like	McCarty’s	view,	which	
posits	only	a	 contingent	and	highly	precarious	 connection	between	
practical	 reasoning	and	what	we	desire	 to	do;	or	 something	 like	Al-
lison’s	view,	which	insists	that	desire	can	only	influence	practical	rea-
soning	by	being	transformed	into	something	other	than	a	mere	desire,	
namely,	 a	 general	maxim	 for	 action.	 The	 assumption	 of	 a	 dualistic	









peal	 to	exactly	 this	kind	of	 interaction	in	order	to	explain	weakness.	
The	fact	that	existing	frameworks	are	unable	to	do	so	is,	I	would	argue,	
Cf.	Morrisson,	 “On	Kantian	Maxims:	A	 reconciliation	of	 the	 Incorporation	













or	stormy	and	transitory;	 rather,	 they	 take	root	and	can	
even	 co-exist	 with	 rationalizing.	…	 Passion	 always	 pre-





rated	 into	maxims.	This	suggests	 that	at	 least	some	agential	 failures	
cannot	be	accounted	for	by	appealing	to	maxim-formation.	Now,	we	
can	ask:	 is	 this	kind	of	 failure	an	 instance	of	weakness?	 I	will	argue	





































to	be	 followed”	 (R	6:29).	With	 some	 further	 analysis,	 the	parenthet-















a	 failure	of	 good	principle	 application	 seems	overly	 theoretical	 and	
34.	Not	 all	 commentators	 read	 these	 terms	 as	 I	 have.	 Stephen	 Palmquist,	 for	
example,	 reads	 ‘in hypothesi’	 more	 literally,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 evidence	 that	
“Kant	 treats	 the	 evil	 propensity	 as	 a	 hypothesis	 throughout	 his	 exposition”	
















of	 the	 noumenal	 deed,	 the	 ultimate	 explanation	 of	 human	 action	
must	be	rooted	in	rational,	as	opposed	to	merely	sensible,	activity.	But	













raft)	explicitly	 in	 the	explanation	of	weakness,	he	does	describe	 the	
cognitive	activity	 that	 is	elsewhere	attributed	to	 it.	As	 I	have	shown,	
Kant	describes	weakness	as	“the	general	weakness	of	the	human	heart	
in	complying with the adopted maxims”	(R	6:29,	emphasis	mine),	suggest-
ing	that	the	issue	is	not	bad	maxims,	but	some	failure	in	their	applica-
tion.	When	 discussing	 the	 noumenal	 deed,	 he	 also	marks	 a	 distinc-
tion	between	“the	ultimate	ground	for	the	acceptance	or observance	of	





without	also	 increasing	 the	efficacy	 that	 the	 representation	of	 these	










ment	 could	 build	 virtue	 and	 thereby	 overcome	moral	weakness,	 as	

















I	am	attributing	 to	Kant.	 In	her	 recent	book,	Melissa	Merritt	also	draws	at-







or	 motivational	 element	 required	 to	 explain	 moral	 weakness.	 Con-
sider	a	helpful	remark	from	the	preface	to	the	Groundwork.	Here,	Kant	
affirms	that	a priori	laws	of	pure	practical	reason	
no	doubt	 still	 require	 a	 judgment	 sharpened	by	 experi-
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the	ends	 it	 is	a	duty	 to	have,	or,	more	precisely,	 the	ends	one	freely	
determines	oneself	to	have	in	accordance	with	the	moral	law.	It	is	in	
exploring	this	basic	description	of	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue	that	the	first	
obstacle	 to	 good	 practical	 judgment	 comes	 to	 light,	 revealing	 deep	
difficulties	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 freedom	 in	 sense-dependent	 rational	
beings.	
2.2.1 The Problem of Indeterminacy
As	soon	as	Kant	specifies	that	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue	concerns	those	
ends	adopted	through	self-determination	in	accordance	with	univer-





















2.2 The Obstacles to Good Practical Judgment Constitutive of Weakness
The	 interrelated	 obstacles	 to	 practical	 judgment	 that	will	 be	my	 fo-
cus	in	this	section	arise	most	prominently	in	the	Introduction	to	the	
Doctrine	of	Virtue	 in	 the	Metaphysics of Morals.	As	we	will	 see,	 they	
are	 the	Problem	of	 Indeterminacy	and	 the	Problem	of	Affect.	These	
are	the	two	most	basic	obstacles	to	sound	practical	judgment,	because	
they	 capture	 the	difficulties	 inherent	 to	 the	 two-stemmed	nature	 of	
sense-dependent	practical	 reason.	On	 the	one	hand,	our	 rational	na-
ture	allows	us	to	act	from	universal	principles	that	must	be	applied	to	
particular	empirically	determined	contexts.	This	aspect	of	our	nature	







ficult.	These	 two	obstacles	 are	 thus	 inextricably	bound	up	with	our	
basic	constitution	as	finite,	embodied,	sensing	rational	beings.	They	
are	not	so	much	psychological	quirks	as	a priori	marks	of	our	fallibility.







necessary	division	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 freedom.	While	 considerations	
of	 right	give	principles	 to	 regulate	external	 freedom,	 considerations	
of	virtue	yield	principles	for	the	realization	of	inner	freedom.	As	Kant	
clarifies,	inner	freedom	is	thus	“the	condition	of	all	duties of virtue”	(MS 















how	 far	 should	 one	 expend	 one’s	 resources	 in	 practic-
ing	beneficence?	Surely	not	to	the	extent	that	he	himself	





the	difficulties	 inherent	 to	 living	out	 the	duty	of	beneficence.	While	





needs	 to	heed	 the	 individual’s	private	conception	of	happiness	 (MS 
6:454).	 Put	differently,	while	 the	 general	 end	of	 beneficence	 is	 com-
manded	by	 reason,	whether	a	particular	action	 in	a	given	empirical	
38.	Merritt	 also	 calls	 attention	 to	 the	 importance	of	 cultivating	 the	 capacity	 to	
recognize	the	relevant	moral	aspects	of	particular	situations:	e.g.,	“the	moral	
law	is	grasped	in concreto in	the	recognition	of	how	particular	facts	about	one’s	






































ficult	 to	know	how	and	whether	 the	 larger	end	of	practicing	academic	phi-
losophy	will	fit	 into	a	holistic	 vision	of	my	 lasting	happiness.	Given	 these	
contrasting	types	of	indeterminacy,	the	weak	agent	in	a	particular	empirical	
context	 could	have	a	hazy	 sense	of	how	 to	 fulfill	 their	moral	duties,	but	a	
vivid	 sense	 of	what	would	bring	 immediate	 pleasure	 or	 pain,	 the	 latter	 of	
which	exercises	influence	on	what	they	ultimately	do.	I	am	very	grateful	to	an	
anonymous	reviewer	for	pressing	me	to	be	clearer	on	this	point.	










2.2.2 The Problem of Affect
While	 the	problem	of	 indeterminacy	highlights	 reason’s	need	 to	 fur-
ther	specify	a priori	principles	through	concrete	judgments	about	par-
ticular	contexts,	the	problem	of	affect	draws	our	attention	to	the	way	
these	 latter	 contexts	 can	be	 laden	with	 affective	meaning	 that	 influ-
























Lest	 one	 think	 that	 the	problem	of	 indeterminacy	 is	 an	obstacle	
only	to	be	encountered	in	a	few	marginal	cases	or	with	respect	to	a	





claim	 that	 “ethical	 duties	 are	 of	 wide	 obligation,	 whereas	 duties	 of	
right	are	of	narrow	obligation”	(MS	6:390).	Perhaps	the	best	evidence	













Through	 the	 example	 about	 the	 author	 and	 his	 reader,	 Kant	 high-
lights	a	crucial	 task	for	 judgment:	 that	of	determining	how	different	
duties	 of	 virtue	 should	 limit	 one	 another	when	 they	 converge	 in	 a	
particular	 sensibly	 given	 context.	 The	 reader	 is	 at	 once	 sensitive	 to	
their	duty	not	to	lie,	and	their	duty	to	consider	the	happiness	of	the	
author.	Though	one	of	these	duties	is	“negative”	in	character	—	lying	




and	 feel	—	including	 their	 more	 idiosyncratic	 dispositions	 towards	
particular	 feelings	—	in	 terms	 of	 psychological	 laws	 that	 track	 physi-



























of	 the	poor	 servant	 subject	 to	his	 rage,	which	makes	 the	 scenario	morally	
relevant.	The	problem	of	affect	 is	key	 to	either	 reading,	 though	matters	of	
prudence	are	not	my	focus	here.
Though	 Kant	 typically	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘affect’	 in	 a	 more	 general	
sense	to	describe	what	sensory	contact	with	an	object	produces	in	the	
subject,	 in	 this	 context,	 the	 term	 takes	 on	 a	more	 specific	meaning.	
Kant	 describes	 an	 affect	 as	 “belonging	 to	 feeling	 insofar	 as,	 preced-
ing	reflection,	it	makes	this	impossible	or	more	difficult”	(MS	6:407).	
Kant’s	remarks	on	affect	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue	assign	the	concept	
a	 key	 role	 in	 overcoming	 weakness	 and	 developing	 virtue	 (cf.	MS 
6:407,	cited	previously),	but	his	development	of	 the	concept	 itself	 is	
relatively	sparse.	Accordingly,	it	helps	to	supplement	this	account	with	
his	more	 in-depth	treatment	 in	Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View. In	Book	III,	on	the	Faculty	of	Desire,	he	describes	affect	in	simi-





conception	 of	 feeling	 that	 focuses	 on	 its	 quasi-mechanical	 strength	
of	 force.	This	would	pose	a	problem	for	 the	present	 reading,	 for,	as	
we	have	seen,	the	quasi-mechanical	view	saddles	us	with	a	dualistic	






account	 offered	 by	Morrisson,	 “On	Kantian	Maxims”,	 pp.	 85−7.	 In	 defense	
of	Allison’s	position,	Morrisson	insists	 that	even	weak	action	must	express	
a	chosen	maxim,	suggesting	that	Kant’s	view	of	weakness	is	better	illustrated	






ment	and	 its	ability	 to	cope	with	 indeterminacy	and	affect,	 rather	 than	 im-
moral	maxim-formation,	which	better	captures	the	later	stages	of	evil.	


































































singularly	 in	 the	agent’s	 limited	capacity	 for	reflection,	 that	 they	are	
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Here,	Kant	distinguishes	between	 two	 types	of	moral	 transgression:	
one	that	involves	intentionally	incorporating	sensible	incentives	into	
one’s	maxim,	and	one	that	involves	unintentionally	lacking	virtue	due	
to	weakness.	 Insofar	 as	 aiming	 for	 virtue	 is	 closely	 attended	by	 the	
problem	of	 indeterminacy,	 there	 opens	 up	 space	 for	 this	 difference.	
One	can	have	a	will	 that	 is	good	 in	 the	abstract,	 i.e.,	a	will	 that	has	






an	 affect	 is	 called	 precipitate	 or	 rash	 (animus praeceps),	
and	reason	says,	through	the	concept	of	virtue,	that	one	
should	get hold of oneself.	Yet	this	weakness	in	the	use	of	
one’s	understanding	 coupled	with	 the	 strength	of	one’s	
emotions	is	only	a	lack of virtue	and,	as	it	were,	something	







to	grapple	with	 the	affects	 that	 influence	and	narrow	 their	practical	
judgment.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 transgression	 best	 understood	 as	
moral	weakness.
2.3 Moral Weakness as a Description of Noumenal Character
The	foregoing	analysis	of	the	main	obstacles	to	practical	judgment	was	
largely	conducted	with	an	eye	 to	explaining	actions	or	deeds	 in	 the	











by	 strong	 feeling,	as	demonstrated	 in	 the	case	of	 timidity	discussed	
above.	
Now	that	the	obstacles	to	good	practical	 judgment	have	been	ex-








imperfect	 duties	 alone	 are,	 accordingly,	 duties of virtue.	
Fulfillment	 of	 them	 is	 merit (meritum)	 =+a;	 but	 failure	






as	 rather	mere	want of virtue,	 lack	of	moral	 strength	 (de-
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instead	 of	 following	 this	 law	 absolutely	 as	 sufficient	 in-
centive	 (which	alone	 is	unconditionally	good,	and	with	
which	there	cannot	be	further	hesitation),	the	human	be-
ing	 looked	 about	 for	 yet	 other	 incentives	 (III:6)	which	
can	be	good	only	conditionally	(i.e.	so	far	as	they	do	not	
infringe	 the	 law).	And he made it his maxim — if one 
thinks of an action as originating from freedom with 
consciousness — to follow the law of duty, not from 
duty but, if need be, also with an eye to other aims.	He	





finally,	 the	 preponderance	 of	 the	 sensory	 inducements	









ultimate,	unconditional	end.	Before	 these	 later	stages	 take	hold,	 the	
agent	 is	 described	 as	 looking	 about	 “for	 yet	 other	 incentives	 (III:6)”	













































































are	 noted	 here.	 First,	 any	 sensibly	 given	 context	will	 reveal	 a	 num-
ber	of	converging	practical	factors,	including	various	ends	to	consider.	








ally	means	 “that	which	 is	desired”.44	On	Kant’s	 terminology,	 the	pas-
sage	 thus	describes	desire	born	 in	 response	 to	an	all-encompassing	
“affect”	that	arises	in	light	of	one’s	sensibly	given	context.	As	he	implies	














































tivated	capacity	 to	actualize	 this	pure	disposition	 in	response	 to	 the	
potentially	infinite	sensibly	given	contexts	that	could	confront	them.	















2.4 Tying Everything Together 
One	final	set	of	Religion passages	discussing	the	relationship	between	
noumenal	and	phenomenal	deeds	should	help	tie	everything	together	
by	accounting	 for	 the	various	pieces	of	 terminology	 that	have	been	
introduced.	These	are	 the	passages	where	Kant	speaks	of	 the	moral	
agent	as	undergoing	a	revolution	with	respect	to	their	noumenal	char-
acter	and	a	slow	reformation	with	 respect	 to	 their	phenomenal	one	
(roughly,	R	6:45−8).	 I	 take	these	passages	to	support	 the	reading	ad-







self-deception,	 but	 of	 gaining	 the	 practiced	 judgment	 that	 can	 deal	











views	 is	 the	assumption	 that	 for	practical	 reason	 to	demonstrate	au-
tonomy	in	the	noumenal	realm,	we	must	think	of	the	agent	as	making	
a	voluntaristic	meta-choice	to	at	least	sometimes	prioritize	one’s	own	
happiness	over	morality.	Differences	 in	moral	 character	would	 then	
correspond	 to	 how	 frequent	 or	 all-encompassing	 this	 choice	 is.	On	





















when	 they	 conflict	with	 the	 claims	of	 inclination	 reflects	 the	 lack	of	 a	 full	
commitment	to	these	principles	in	the	first	place”	(Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p.	
159).	
48.	Cf.	Allison:	“thus,	self-deception	enters	the	picture	at	the	very	beginning,	de-









Though	 all	 human	beings	 are	weak	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 progress	
is	never	finished,	 I	 take	 this	passage	 to	 suggest	 that	one	 is	more	or	
less	weak	insofar	as	one’s	supreme	maxim	is	more	or	less	stable	as	a	
ground	of	phenomenal	action.	The	reading	of	Kant	I	have	offered	here	
interprets	 this	 stability	 as	 cognitive	 and	 only	 thereby	 motivational.	
That	 is,	 the	agent	 is	more	stable	and	less	weak	insofar	as	their	 judg-
ment	 is	better	able	 to	deal	with	 the	obstacles	of	 indeterminacy	and	
affect,	and	so	arrive	at	a	determinate	representation	of	what	to	do	—	as	
a	deed	understood	in	the	phenomenal	sense.	Such	an	agent	demon-










46.	At	 this	point,	we	can	ask	the	further	question	of	how the	moral	agent	 is	 to	
make	 progress	 against	 the	 constant	 obstacles	 of	 indeterminacy	 and	 affect,	
and	 it	 is	here	 that	Kant’s	discussion	of	 the	ethical	 community	united	 in	 re-
ligious	 practice	 from	part	 three	 of	 the	Religion	 becomes	 absolutely	 critical.	
For	some	recent	commentary	on	this	historically	neglected	part	of	his	view,	
see	Palmquist	(Comprehensive Commentary,	chap.	7),	DiCenso,	Kant’s	Religion	
within	 the	Boundaries	of	Mere	Reason:	A Commentary,	 chap.	 5;	 and	Paster-
nack	(Kant on Religion	within	the	Boundaries	of	Mere	Reason,	chap.	5).
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the	stages	of	 impurity	and	depravity.	We	should	say,	rather,	 that	 the	
































tions	running	contrary	 to	 the	moral	 law.	The	obstacles	of	 indetermi-
nacy	and	affect	 involve	 sense-based	 feelings,	desires,	 and	ends,	but	





















response	 to	 indeterminacy	 and	 affect.	 Our	 basic	 moral	 orientation	





























50.	Though	 I	would	 claim	 that	both	views	are	ultimately	varieties	of	 the	 ratio-
nalist	dualism	paradigmatically	 expressed	by	Allison,	 it	 is	noteworthy	 that	
Thomas	Hill	Jr.	(in	Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations,	pp.	120−1)	and	





it	(Kant on Reflection and Virtue,	p.	192).





















a	difficult	 truth	 in	a	considerate	way	 that	does	not	disrespect	or	un-
necessarily	hurt	others.	On	the	view	articulated	here,	what	is	unique	
about	 the	traditional	case	 is	 that	 the	agent	has	a	developed	enough	
judgment	 to	 immediately	 recognize	 that	 their	 response	 to	 their	 cur-
rent	 situation	 is	 inadequate	—	a	 recognition	 that	 can	 be	 missing	 in	
other	cases	which	could	also	fit	under	the	broader	sense	of	weakness	
Kant	 identifies	—	though	this	 judgment	is	not	yet	developed	enough	
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